Abstract-This paper contributes to the empirical literature on price stickiness by documenting a high rate of nominal rigidity among housing rents in the United States between 1974 and 1981. Of the units studied, 29% had no change in nominal rents from year to year. The incidence was much higher (a) in years and cities with a low median nominal rent growth rate, and among (b) units whose tenants continued from the previous year and (c) units in small buildings. A little less than half of the nominal rigidity can be ascribed to grid pricing. Possible explanations, as well as the likely distributive and allocative implications, are discussed.
I. Introduction
M uch of the macroeconomic debate turns on the stickiness of nominal prices. Although whether microlevel stickiness must lead to substantial nominal rigidity at the aggregate level remains an open question, surely a prerequisite of the New Keynesian approach is that rigidity exists at the micro level. 1 This paper documents a high degree of nominal rigidity in apartment rents. Over the period 1974-1981, 29% of the apartments in the Annual Housing Survey (AHS) panel that I use had no change in nominal rent from one year to the next. A little less than half of that can be attributed to grid pricing.
The incidence varies in intuitive ways. Nominal rigidity is higher in years and cities that have a low median nominal rent growth rate. Units that turn over have a lower, though still substantial, incidence than those in which the tenant stays an additional year. The incidence of nominal rigidity is also higher for units located in smaller buildings.
Others have shown evidence of nominal price rigidity before, although only for goods that represent a tiny share of consumer expenditure. Thus Cechetti (1986) showed that even in the high-inflation decade of the 1970s, newsstand magazine prices remained unchanged for three and a quarter years, on average. Kashyap (1995) found that the nominal prices of chamois shirts, fishing rods, and like items in semiannual catalogs typically remained unchanged for more than a year. Working with Israeli data on wine, fish, and meat products, Lach and Tsiddon (1996) found an average nominal price quotation duration of 2.5-3 months, in a period of 4% monthly inflation. Evidence of a different sort is provided by Levy et al. (1997) , who show that only 70%-80% of supermarket prices are changed in response to wholesale price changes.
For Ball and Mankiw (1994) , that the individual goods examined are small budget items is to be expected. "For this theory, the most important prices are for those goods bought with money, since the price of goods bought with credit do not directly affect the demand for money. Goods bought with money tend to be small retail items, such as newspapers and haircuts" (p. 131).
One nonetheless suspects that the authors would not be disappointed to find nominal rigidity in a good that is not a "small retail item." Indeed, housing is perhaps the one large consumer item not paid for with credit. For the renters of the units in my sample, housing expenditures constitutes 20%-30% of yearly income. It is also interesting to find nominal rigidity in a good whose asset prices are known to be quite volatile.
Rental housing also differs from goods examined in prior research in the manner in which its price is determined. Unlike for magazines or L. L. Bean chamois shirts, where a single seller of a homogeneous good sets a price common to many consumers, who may purchase at will, the market for rental housing consists of heterogeneous goods for which negotiation typically attends each transaction. Few apartments are rented in the anonymous manner of small retail goods. Price may be tailored by the landlord to the particular tenant, or determined in bargaining between the two. Even when a landlord follows a fixed-rent policy, the opportunity to deviate from that policy is costlessly available, for a new contract must be produced, in any case, for each new tenant and at each lease renewal regardless of price. Unlike supermarket goods, for which new price tags must be printed and applied when the price is changed (Levy et al., 1997) , or chamois shirts, where the page in the catalog has to recomposed (Kashyap, 1995) , here there is no physical menu-cost saving from leaving price unchanged.
Some other explanation must therefore be at work here. 2 I conjecture that using the previous nominal price economizes on the costs of information acquisition and negotiation. Such a policy saves a landlord from having to determine the changed opportunity cost-namely, the change in the market rent. In bargaining with a continuing tenant, a convention of using the previous nominal price also saves negotiation time and emotional stress for both parties. This is especially so if a personal relationship, however limited, has developed between them, so that the issue of fairness comes to the fore. The explanation is consistent with the finding that nominal rigidity is greater when the previous year's tenant stays. Since landlords of units in smaller buildings are likely to own fewer units, and if we assume that tenant-landlord relationships are more influenced by fairness when the landlord is small, then the explanation is also consistent with the greater nominal rigidity in smaller buildings.
Note that real price rigidity would achieve the same savings in negotiation costs, and most of the savings in information acquisition (as inflation rates are not available daily in U.S. papers, there might be some additional cost in obtaining them). Furthermore, during this period, real, instead of nominal, rigidity would have come closer to indexing the price to the median relative price increase: the median nominal rental price was increasing at 6% a year, while inflation was 9%. Thus, nominal rigidity entailed a 6% discrepancy from the real increase (three weeks' rent in a one-year lease), whereas real rigidity would have meant only a 3% discrepancy. Granted, overshooting the equilibrium relative price might be costlier than undershooting it. Nonetheless, that we observe substantial nominal rigidity and no real rigidity must surely mean that there is a large degree of money illusion-"a tendency to think in terms of nominal rather than real monetary values" (Shafir, Diamond, & Tversky, 1997) -at work in this market.
The next section documents how nominal rigidity depends upon the median growth rate, turnover status, and building size. Section III shows that these results reflect nominal rigidity across different contracts and not within lease interviewing. Section IV discusses grid pricing, that is, the tendency to set prices at multiples of certain dollar amounts. Section V estimates a probit regression, thus providing a multivariate analysis of nominal rigidity, and isolating the part due to grid pricing. Section VI considers whether adjustments along other margins substitute for nominal price adjustments. Section VII concludes.
II. The Incidence Level, Turnover, and Building Size

A. Some Basic Facts
The Annual Housing Survey (AHS) National Sample (1974 Sample ( -1981 ) is a panel of housing units, based on the 1970 Census. It is an unbalanced sample, principally because samples of newly constructed units are added each year, other units are demolished, and a few interviews are not completed. I restrict the sample to units in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) with no rent control restrictions over the 1974-1981 period. 3 Only units for which rent is paid monthly and is recorded (rent above $1999 per month is top-coded, and I drop such units), and which are neither in public housing nor occupied by tenants whose rent is partly subsidized by the government, are included; these conditions are required to hold for the year and the previous year. There are 11,418 observations, each constituting a housing unit and two adjacent years of completed interviews.
I measure a unit's nominal growth rate by dr ϭ ln R t Ϫ ln R tϪ1, where R t is the nominal rent in year t and is obtained from the answer to the question "What is the monthly rent?" in the year t interview. Figure 1 displays the empirical cumulative distribution function of dr, by year. Almost all of the dispersion reflects differences in growth rates within the SMSAs. In 1981, for example, the overall variance of dr was 0.08, while the variance of the mean dr across SMSAs was a mere 0.007.
The fraction of units with no nominal rent change is measured by the length of the vertical line at zero. Clearly, there is a large degree of nominal rigidity in all years. There is no real rigidity, that is, the growth rate is not equal to the inflation rate: zero is the only mass point in any of the years. 4 Summary statistics of the nominal rent change are presented in table 1, also by year. The incidence of nominal rigidity varies between 23% and 34%, with an average of 29% across all years. It is clearly negatively correlated with the inflation rate. This result is intuitive: a fixed nominal price is harder to sustain in an inflationary environment. The incidence is more closely associated with the median growth rate of nominal rent, with which it is nearly perfectly inversely ranked. (Unlike the mean, the median is unaffected by censoring in which small changes in the nominal rent are replaced by zero changes.)
The incidence of a nominal increase is also nearly perfectly inversely ranked with the median. The incidence of a nominal decrease is not. 5 The dispersion, measured as the difference between the median and the 75th percentile, is relatively constant across years. Unlike the standard deviation, this measure is unaffected by censoring below the median.
The relationship between the incidence of nominal rigidity and the overall growth rate can be explored at the SMSA level as well. Figure 2 plots the two against each other, by year. When the incidence is sufficiently high, the 3 The AHS gives no geographic information below the state level for non-SMSA units. SMSAs with rent control are identified primarily by National Multi Housing Council (1981 Council ( , 1982 , as well as Baar (1983) , Downs (1988) , Gilderbloom and Applebaum (1988) , Gilderbloom (1981) , Capek and Gilderbloom (1992) , Block and Olsen (1981) , Niebanck (1985) , Rydell et al. (1981) , and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1991) . The SMSAs in the sample, with their shares of observations, are Chicago (29%), Columbus (3%), Dallas (6%), Detroit (8%), Hartford (2%), Kansas City (5%), Madison (1%), Memphis (3%), Milwaukee (6%), Minneapolis (6%), New Orleans (4%), Newport (1%), Orlando (2%), Phoenix (4%), Pittsburgh (7%), Portland (5%), Salt Lake City (2%), San Antonio (2%), Spokane (1%), Tacoma (1%), Wichita (1%).
New York City has had rent control of some sort or another over the postwar years, and Los Angeles imposed rent control in 1979. The distribution among SMSAs is fairly constant across years. 4 Real rigidity combined with a small degree of uncertainty about the inflation rate would translate into a steep but finite slope at that point. This, too, is absent from the figures.
5 Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) argued that, in survey data, most (within-job) nominal wage cuts represent measurement error, a claim bolstered by Altonji and Devereux's (1999) and Fehr and Goette's (2000) showing that wage cuts are extremely rare in two large corporations' administrative records. That may also be the case for nominal rent cuts. Note that classical measurement error in reporting the rent level would lead to a downward bias in measuring nominal rigidity. complication of a zero median arises, although this occurs for small SMSA sample sizes only. The regression of the incidence against the median growth rate is incidence ϭ 0.42
ϫ (median growth rate),
A 1% increase in the median growth rate decreases the incidence of nominal rigidity by 2.2% [Compare Card and Hyslop (1996) , who find that a 1% increase in inflation decreases the incidence of nominal wage rigidity by 1.4%.] The regression predicts (out of sample) that an SMSA with a median growth rate of 19% will exhibit no nominal rigidity at all. Conditioning on SMSA yields an estimated slope of Ϫ1.9. The slope remains significant both here and on restricting the sample to nonzero median rents.
B. Turnover Status
Nominal rigidity also varies with turnover status. A unit is identified as having turned over between the two interviews if the interviewer checked "Yes" to the statement "Household head moved here during the last 12 months" after having asked: "When did . . . (head) move into this house (apartment)?" which is answered in the year and month. 6 Of the observations, 35% are turnover (T) units. Among units that had turned over in the previous period, 49% are T-units in the current period. This rate declines, so that 36% of tenants who survive through a second year leave before a third, 29% of those who survive through a third leave thereafter, and 16% who have lived in the same apartment four or more years leave in the current year. Table 2 , columns (1)- (3), display the proportions of units that experienced a nominal decline, an increase, and no change, by tenure status and year. Overall, 36% of no-turnover (N) units experience no change in nominal rent, against 14% of T-units. The incidence of nominal rent rigidity among continuing tenants is much greater than the 15% that Card and Hyslop [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] , National Sample. This is the source for all the remaining tables, except tables 4 and 5. The CPI inflation rate is calculated from the August CPI for all urban consumers (CPI-U). Dispersion is the difference between the 75th quartile and the median. report for their 1979-1992 matched CPS sample of job stayers, or the 7% that Kahn (1998) reports for her similar 1979 -1988 There is also some evidence that decreases are more prevalent among T-units, although that is only clear in [1974] [1975] , when the median growth rate is the lowest. In columns (4)-(6), the sample is restricted to units that obtained a new tenant in the previous year. The general pattern is the same. Figure 3 displays the empirical cumulative distribution function of rental growth rates, by year and by tenure status, for those units that had turned over in the previous year. 8 The more lightly shaded curve represents the distribution of turnover units. There are five noticeable aspects of this figure: (i) There is a large mass at zero nominal change, larger for the N-units but still substantial for the T-units. (ii) Above zero, the two distributions differ in location only. The median growth rate for T-units is about 4% greater than for N-units. (iii) Near and above zero, the distributions flatten out, indicating few small positive changes. (iv) The lower tails are indistinguishable, except for the first two pairs of years. (v) The N-distribution is more stable over time: variation in the gap between the two distributions is due to shifts in the T-distribution.
One interpretation of these figures starts from the observation that when a tenant remains an extra year, there must be ex post surplus in the tenant-landlord relationship. This surplus can be due to mobility costs for the tenant, search costs on either side, revealed tenant quality, and so on. (Obviously, where the surplus is negative, the tenant will leave.) Positive surplus permits the negotiated price to differ from the market price. That the rent for a continuing tenant increases less than for another tenant indicates either that the bargaining structure favors him over the landlord, or that his overall cost of moving is less than the landlord's cost of installing a new tenant, or both.
Alternatively, low rents may be associated with continuing tenants because the old tenant has the first right of refusal on the landlord's offer. We can think of the landlord as setting a price equal to the area-wide rental growth rate plus some random component, which might reflect either mistakes, or differing discount rates or search costs among landlords. Tenants lucky enough to have a landlord who sets a low price are more likely to remain in the apartment.
Distinguishing between these two basic explanations requires an econometric analysis of the selection issue, which would take us beyond the scope of the present paper. 9 Note, however, that both explanations are incomplete, as they provide no obvious role for nominal rigidity. That can be corrected by incorporating a concern for fairness on at least one side of the market into the models. There is by now substantial experimental evidence that bargaining is influenced by notions of fairness, the failure of the large-stakes take-it-or-leave-it experiments being the most dramatic example of that (see, for example, Roth et al., 1991, and Gächter, 2000) . Survey evidence also shows that the 7 Likewise, Altonji and Devereux (1999) report a 12% incidence for their 1971-1992 PSID sample of job stayers, and Fehr and Goette (2000) report rates of 5%-15% in their Swiss survey data. 8 Conditioning on turnover in the previous year is important here, because there is clear evidence that the excess nominal rigidity of units with staying tenants is made up for by jumping back up to the market trend when a new tenant moves in. 9 Using the observed declining turnover hazard, and assuming zero autocorrelation in the landlord's deviation, Genesove (1999) sketches an argument in favor of the first explanation. fairness of wage and price changes is typically judged in nominal terms (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Bewley, 1999; Shafir, Diamond, & Tversky, 1997) . Whatever the structure of offers and counteroffers by landlord and tenant, this literature leads us to expect fairness and money illusion to combine to produce nominally rigid prices in negotiated rents.
C. Building Size as a Proxy for Landlord Size
There are a number of reasons why we might expect less nominal rigidity for units owned by large than by small landlords. First, acquiring information on changed market or inflationary conditions incurs a fixed cost. Second, fairness concerns are likely to increase with the degree of interaction between tenant and landlord; this is presumably greater when the latter is small-for example, because the landlord also handles maintenance, or is resident in the building.
Third, very large (in particular, corporate) landlords can rent out properties via salaried rental agents who are not granted the discretion to set price. The reasons for doing so are the same ones that department stores have for not bargaining with consumers, in contrast with the small retailer or the stall owner in the shuk: strategic commitment to a fixed price (a take-it-or-leave-it offer), or a principal's need to regulate its agents (salespeople). That changes the nature of the price-setting mechanism.
Unfortunately, the AHS does not collect information on the landlord's characteristics. As a proxy for landlord size, I use building size: the number of "living quarters . . . in [the] house (building)," which the AHS does report. Table 3 shows the incidence by building size. Units in smaller buildings do indeed have a much greater incidence of nominal rigidity. Nearly half of the detached houses show nominal rigidity, compared to 13% in 50ϩ-unit apartment buildings.
But are units in large buildings owned by large landlords? Fortunately, the Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS), which was administered to the owners or managers of a national sample of units drawn from the 1993 AHS sample, reports both types of variables. Table 4 shows that units in small buildings are more likely to be owned by an individual investor than by a partnership, corporation, or institution. 10 The last column shows that among units owned 10 The table uses a subsample in which all non-MSA units, as well as those under rent control or receiving a government subsidy, are dropped. Sixteen units for which the lease term is not reported are dropped to ensure compatibility with table 5. Since the POMS does not reveal the city, I cannot restrict the sample to the SMSAs of the principal sample. by an individual investor, the average number of units owned by the landlord is greater, the larger the building. Tables 3 and 4 together suggest that nominal rigidity is less common among units belonging to large landlords. I have no way of determining the importance of the three explanations offered above. But the third explanation is particularly interesting, for, if correct, it has obvious implications for the changing sensitivity of economies to nominal shocks as they develop and large retailing units become more prevalent.
III. Contractual Versus Noncontractual Rigidity
To what extent does the observed nominal rigidity reflect fixed prices within a contract? Clearly, none at all for turnover units; the two reported rents are, by definition, from different contracts. For nonturnover units, whether the quoted monthly rents originate from different contracts or not is not observable. Unfortunately, the AHS reports neither the term of the lease-or even whether there is a lease-nor the date of the interview.
The POMS does report the term. Table 5 shows the distribution of the term by building size. 11 Of all units, 15% are rented out with no lease at all, 40% have a lease of less than a year, and 43% a lease of exactly one year. A mere 2.3% of units are rented with a lease of more than a year's duration. 12 Could one be sure that the AHS interview dates were a year apart, then, given the distribution of lease terms, one could conclude that the quoted rents were almost surely from different contracts. However, the AHS is conducted in the fall of the year over a three-to four-month period. 13 It is thus conceivable that a given unit's interviews were conducted less than one year apart, and so, even with a one-year lease, within the same contractual period. 14 A difference of less than one year between the two interview dates would 11 The table uses a subsample in which all non-MSA units, as well as those under rent control or receiving a government subsidy, are dropped. Since the POMS does not reveal the city, I cannot restrict the sample to the SMSAs of the principal sample.
12 Hubert's (1995) adverse-selection model suggests one explanation why there are so few leases longer than one year. In this model, the term of the lease is used as a screening device, since good tenants will be more willing to accept shorter-term leases (or even tenant-at-will status), at lower rents, than bad tenants. 13 Interviews were conducted in August-October (1974), OctoberDecember (1975 OctoberDecember ( , 1976 , October-January (1977 , 1978 , SeptemberDecember (1979 SeptemberDecember ( , 1981 , and mid-August-December (1980) . See Annual Housing Survey, various years.
14 That is not conclusively so, because the Census Bureau might have surveyed the units in the same sequence in both years, and one suspects that most of the interviewing is concentrated at the beginning of each period. And yet the timing of interviews does not seem to be the reason for the finding of nominal rigidity. First, the reported interview periods for the 1974 and 1975 surveys overlap in October only, whereas all the remaining pairs of years have a three-or four-month overlap. If a substantial part of the nominal rigidity were due to less than full-year interview gaps, we would expect to see a much greater degree of nominal rigidity, twice or three times as much, in 1975 much, in -1976 much, in and subsequent years than in 1974 much, in -1975 much, in . Yet 1974 much, in -1975 growth rates look very much like the rest.
Second, rent changes of units in which the previous year's tenant originally moved in during the months of January through July will almost always capture different contracts. Yet columns (7) through (9) of table 2, which restrict the sample to such units, display no reduction in nominal rigidity.
Third, micro data on rents from 1988-1992, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the CPI rent index from biennial visits to a panel of rental units, show the degree of nominal rigidity measured at eighteen-month intervals to be 37%, 15 which is higher than the 29% incidence that we document here.
Finally, one also observes nominal rigidity at two-year intervals in the AHS: 12% of units have the same nominal rent in year t as in year t-2. This is more than the 8% one would expect were nominal rigidity in one year independent of nominal rigidity in the next. Since only 2.3% of leases are for more than a year, most of these occurrences must reflect rigidity across different contracts.
Taken together, these arguments show that interview gaps of less than a year are not a serious concern, and that one may safely assume that the reported rents originate from different leases.
IV. Grid Pricing
It is sometimes asserted that observed nominal rigidity is the outcome of the restriction to pricing on a grid: that if prices are rounded to the nearest multiple of 10, for example, then small underlying shocks that would otherwise lead to a change in prices of $4, say, will result in no nominal change. Since what consequences this would have for monetary neutrality appears to be an open question, it is important to determine the extent to which grid pricing is responsible for the incidence of nominal rigidity. 16 Grid pricing is clearly present. Columns (1) and (2) of table 6 show the distribution of the modulus terms in reported rents in 1975 , respectively. For example, in 1975 , 7% of units had rents that were multiples of $100, and 8% had rents that were multiples of $50, but not $100. I have ordered the grid points in what seems a natural hierarchy; for example, where there is a tendency to price at $10 intervals, there is also a tendency to price at $25 intervals, but not necessarily vice versa. Predictably, there is a shift in the distribution over time as nominal prices and rents increase. Whereas in 1975, 13% were not multiples of $5, in 1981 only 8% were.
Columns (1) and (2) overstate the extent of grid pricing. For example, some fraction of units priced at $10 intervals reflect a tendency to price at $5 intervals, not $10. Columns (3) and (4) adjust for that. 17 We see that almost 65% of rents 15 Aside from the different time and place coverage, the higher rate may be due to an oversampling of N-units (Crone, Nakamura, & Voith, 2001 ). Unfortunately, the CPI micro data do not record building size, and the tenure status variable lumps together all durations longer than six months, making further analysis of the data along the lines of this paper impossible. 16 Unfortunately, this seems to be a matter of oral debate only. 17 Let p be the vector of data in column (1), and define the matrix in 1975 were priced according to a $5 grid, and that pricing on a grid coarser than $25 was quite rare. Grid pricing is associated with nominal rigidity. Columns (5)- (7) show the incidence of nominal rigidity by grid point, for the full sample and the T and N subsamples, respectively. The incidence is increasing in the hierarchy: only 13% of units on a $1 grid point had zero nominal growth over the subsequent year, compared to 40% on the $100 grid point. This difference is, of course, understated, in view of the above discussion. Note the substantial amount of nominal rigidity even on the $1 grid, suggesting that grid pricing explains only part of the rigidity.
V. Multivariate Analysis
The single-variate analysis thus far has not considered the question of whether any of these relationships are spurious. Because the sample size is not large enough to form cells of an adequate number of observations in all cases, I consider the ad hoc expedient of a probit analysis of nominal rigidity.
Estimates from the probit regressions are presented in table 7. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the nominal growth in rent is 0. All the regressors are dummy variables, with the dummy variables for a $1 grid point, a 50-or more-unit building, 1980-1981, and a turnover unit serving as the omitted dummies, depending on the set of dummies included in each regression. Each of these values corresponds to the cell with the lowest nominal rigidity for the given variable. Jointly, they define a baseline case, whose probability of nominal rigidity is given by the row labeled ⌽ (constant).
The first column uses the whole sample. We see that the right-side variables affect nominal rigidity in the same way as in the bivariate analysis. The remaining columns restrict the sample to units that turned over in the previous year, with column (3) adding a dummy variable for units that did not turn over in period t. The results are essentially the same. The ⌽ (constant) term in the last column indicates that (i) in 1981 (when median rents were increasing at 7%), a unit (ii) in a 50ϩ-unit building (iii) which turned over that year, and (iv) for which the previous year's price was set on a grid no coarser than one dollar, has a mere 2% probability of having an unchanged nominal rent. 18 This low rate is important in two respects. Given that none of the variables should be correlated with within-lease interviewing, it provides further evidence that observed nominal rigidity is not an artifact of within-lease interviewing. It also suggests that there is no additional factor that both has a large effect on nominal rigidity and varies substantially within the sample.
If the unit is detached instead, the probability increases to 12%; if the unit did not turn over, it is 6% more than the baseline case. A detached unit that did not turn over has an incidence of nominal rigidity of 28%. If, in addition, the previous year's price was set on a $100 grid, the incidence doubles to 56%. Thus, the previous findings do not result from spurious correlations.
Finally, the probit estimates allow us to predict the degree of nominal rigidity in the absence of grid pricing. To do so, I sum over the predicted probabilities obtained when the grid point dummies in table 7 are all set equal to zero, and all other variables to their actual values. The mean predicted incidence is shown in the last rows of the table, labeled ⌽ ($1 grid). It is 16% in the whole sample, or somewhat more than half of the actual incidence of 29%. On the subsample of units that turned over in the previous period, it is 20% among the continuing units (compared to an actual incidence of 36%), and 7% among those that turned over (compared to 14%). These figures are similar to the incidence rates for the $1 grid in the univariate analysis of table 6.
VI. Other Margins
The rent is not the only means by which the overall terms of trade between tenant and landlord might be altered. They are also determined by assigning responsibility for utility Then column (3) is the solution to p ϭ Ab. To understand A, consider row 4 of A, which distributes prices on the $10 grid among the three rounding rules that could yield such an observed modulus of $10. These are the rule of rounding to the nearest $1 (of which the $10 grid provides 8 of its 100 points), a rule that rounds to the nearest $5 (of which the $10 grid provides 8 of its 20 points), and a rule that rounds to the nearest $10 or $25 (of which the $10 grid provides 8 of its 12 points-under the assumption that $25 is ranked above $10 in the hierarchy). 18 As a check on the linear index specification, consider the cell defined by these conditions. The cell contains only five observations, none of which are nominally rigid. Dropping condition (iv), a $1 grid, increases the number of observations to 46, of which only one is nominally rigid. Columns (1) and (2) show the frequency distribution according to grid point. Columns (3) and (4) adjust the distributions, as described in section V in the text. The remaining columns show the incidence of nominal rigidity, by grid point, with column (5) using the whole sample, column (6) the turnover subsample, and column (7) the nonturnover sample.
payments. If this responsibility is reassigned so as to circumvent the nominal rigidity of the rent, the macroeconomic consequences will be mitigated. Furthermore, the extent of rigidity in the overall terms of trade might will be overstated by looking at the rent alone.
As an instrument for splitting the surplus between landlord and tenant, a reassignment of this kind is a poor substitute for the rent. Not only is it coarser than that latter can be, but efficiency considerations will dictate their own assignment, according to monitoring costs, the price of fuel, and the elasticity of the demand for its use. A finding that the parties reassign responsibility for paying utilities in order to circumvent the nominal rigidity in the rent would suggest that nominal illusion over one aspect of payment can lead to inefficient contracts elsewhere in a bilateral relationship. 19 Table 8 (9) shows the proportion of units in which the tenant pays the electricity (gas) bill according to whether the nominal rent changes or not, and according to which party bore the responsibility in the previous year. The rows labeled "Total" show that there is little year-to-year change in the assignment of responsibility for paying the fuel bills. The greater likelihood of a transition from the landlord paying the utility bill to the tenant than vice versa can be explained by the increase in fuel prices during this period, as well as the fact that installing monitoring equipment is a sunk investment.
When the tenant was previously responsible for electricity, his total real housing cost can be reduced by more than inflation, while keeping the nominal rent unchanged, by levying the electricity bill on the landlord instead. But the left panel of table 8 shows reallocation occurring in a mere 1 2 % of the cases in which the nominal rent is unchanged, less than the proportion of cases when the nominal rent does change (1 1 2 %). Likewise, when electricity was previously paid by the landlord, the renter's total real housing cost can be reduced by less than inflation, or even increased, by levying the electricity bill on the tenant instead. That is done in only 6% of the relevant cases; again, this is less often than under a nominal change. Table 9 shows that gas payment responsibility follows the same pattern. Clearly, changes in the assignment of responsibility to pay utility bills do not offset nominal rigidity in the rent. 19 The quality-adjusted price can also be changed by altering the level of maintenance. Likewise, as long as the unit's quality is not a perfect substitute for "other goods" (money), there will be an efficient level of maintenance. I do not consider maintenance, given that the tenant's responses to questions about quality in the AHS are likely to be very subjective. The dependent variable is 1 if there was a zero change in the nominal rent, and 0 otherwise. ⌽ ($1 grid) is the predicted incidence of nominal rigidity without grid pricing. 
VII. Conclusion
This paper has documented substantial nominal rigidity in housing rents. This finding provides credibility to macroeconomic models that rely on such rigidity to explain aggregate economic fluctuations. A little less than half of the incidence can be attributed to grid pricing. It is an open question whether the macroeconomic consequences of nominal rigidity are altered by the extent of the contribution of grid pricing. Even if not, grid pricing is still interesting as a behavioral phenomenon in its own right.
There will also be real consequences of price rigidity at the micro level. Within a continuing tenant-landlord relationship, even if the bargaining is efficient, a tendency to keep the old nominal price at contact renewal time will have a distributional effect. If bargaining is not efficient, nominal rigidity will, in addition, affect mobility and vacancy rates: an unchanged nominal price that substitutes for what would otherwise be a price increase will increase the chances that an existing tenant will stay, and that a new tenant will accept the landlord's offer.
